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## Many U.S. Civilian Roles In Asia May Go to Military

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 9—The Nixon Administration is drawing up plans for the shift of numerous American economic and social programs in South Vietnam and Laos from civilian to military control.

Under the plans, the United States Defense Department would gradually take over, wholly or in part, the financing and operation of such programs as the balancing of the South Vietnamese defense budget, pacification of rural areas, public health, the training of the police and the care of refugees.

Those programs are financed and administered alone or in cooperation with the Defense Department by the Agency for International Development. In many instances the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information Agency also participate.

During the fiscal year ending on June 30, the aid agency, it is estimated, will have spent \$365-million in Vietnam.

The Administration plans to incorporate some of the changes in its revision of the foreign-aid program, which is expected soon. Part of the program will require Congressional approval.

The plans are expected to generate considerable controversy in and out of Congress because they deal with the subject of civilian vs. military control of policy. The contemplated shift could transfer the responsibility of Senate review from the Foreign Relations Committee, which has generally been critical of American operations in Southeast Asia, to the Armed Services Committee, which has generally been sympathetic.

Civilian officials have been citing private remarks by high-ranking officers involved in policy planning for Vietnam, to the effect that civilian leadership is failing and that well-trained Army men should be

increasingly assigned to positions of responsibility in the administration of wartime and postwar programs.

A major argument among Administration officials favoring an increase in the military role in Asian and other support-assistance programs is said to be that the Defense Department is expected to have an easier time getting funds from Congress, where opposition to foreign-aid appropriation has been growing in recent years.

Indications are that the new approach has support in the White House staff as well as among many though not all civilian and military officials in the Defense Department. Top officials in the aid agency are described as resigned to the change, partly because A.I.D. as an entity would disappear under the projected reorganization of the foreign-aid program.

Secretary of State William F. Rogers has participated in the discussions only to a limited extent. The whole question is expected to be reviewed by the National Security Council.

Dr. John A. Hannah, the aid administrator, discussed the problem with President Nixon at the White House May 25 in one of their rare meetings.

In recent public statements Dr. Hannah has made it clear that the "support assistance" programs would be divested from the agency that would be set up to handle overseas economic development under the reorganization, expected to take effect in about a year. He has recognized that some of the support functions would be turned over to the Defense Department.

Other aid officials foresaw a tug-of-war between the Pentagon and civilian agencies over the extent to which the military establishment would assume responsibility for the activities now performed by the aid agency.

They said that the State Department, which is to coordinate the support assistance under the reorganization blueprint, does not have "enough clout," funds or experienced personnel to run the programs.

**Larger C.I.A. Role Foreseen**

The officials also foresaw that the C.I.A. would seek to increase its role in the support

In Vietnam, the C.I.A. is an active partner in the pacification program, which it began eight years ago, and in many other operations.

While the C.I.A. is viewed as a military establishment, A.I.D. recognizes its ability to operate civilian funds and personnel in Vietnam and operate some programs in Vietnam.

Early this year, for example, the United States Agency for International Development, under President Nixon, turned down proposals from the United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon that he sent 135 Army officers as advisers to the aid agency's public safety program, which would build up the South Vietnamese civilian police.

The Defense Department plans to finance several projects that have been authorized and funded by the aid agency, among them a supply of high-powered rifles for South Vietnamese Army units. The fiscal 1971 aid program will finance up to \$100 million in programs that previously were paid for from funds.

In many recent situations, officials said, A.I.D. had to turn to the military for administrators and physicians to run refugee and public-health projects because of a shortage of civilians willing to serve in Vietnam.

**Rapidly Growing Ability**

Such developments indicate the rapidly growing capability of the military, especially the Army, to administer typically civilian programs.

This month the newly reorganized John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, N. C.—originally established by the Army to teach antiguerrilla warfare—will graduate the first class of Army officers trained in the political, social, economic, cultural and linguistic aspects of overseas military activities.

Commenting on the trend, a civilian official said that "the realities of the situation" would increasingly force the Administration to turn to the military for the financing and management of certain programs because of the inability of civilian agencies to muster adequate funds and personnel.

The major institutional change expected to come in the aid agency, President Nixon will send to Congress later this month,

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activities in Laos area A62.

Deriving from the report of the task force on international development headed by Rudolph A. Peterson, retired president of the Bank of America, the Presidential message is expected to recommend a clear separation of international economic-development assistance from military and support aid. It is the latter that, in situations like Vietnam, has been administered by A.I.D. while the Pentagon has handled military sales and grants.

The Peterson report call for

a law covering both military assistance and support assistance, and for an agency on international security cooperation in the State Department that would supersede the present aid agency. The law would vest in the State Department the direction and coordination of the security-assistance program.

While the Defense Department would control military assistance, the State Department, under the Peterson recommendations, would be responsible for support-assistance and public-safety programs.

Senior Administration officials said that it appeared inevitable that considerable responsibility for the support programs would

be shifted to the Pentagon even if, in theory, the State Department retained over-all policy direction.

Officials discussing the situation are convinced that the Pentagon financing will be followed by insistence that projects be increasingly administered by the military.

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CROSS REFERENCE

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## Subversion by C.I.A.

The disclosure that the American economic aid mission in Laos is being used as a cover for intelligence operations in Laos is nothing less than a body blow to the credibility of the peaceful presence of the United States in neutral and friendly nations. The decision to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to subvert an important foreign mission was made during the Kennedy Administration in 1962. The fact that it has thus persisted under three Presidents dramatizes the extent to which the debasement of national and diplomatic ethics has become a non-partisan evil.

John A. Hannah, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, has special reason to recognize the harm done by these undercover games. He knows from bitter experience that they undermine the universities and their scholars who, as keys to the success of both AID and the United States Information Agency, become the unwitting accomplices to the shady business. Dr. Hannah was president of Michigan State University when it became known that one of its foreign task forces had been infiltrated by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959.

Although Dr. Hannah's candid admission is to his credit, his claim that the situation in Laos is a unique transgression strains credulity. To say, as he did, that "our preference is to get rid of this kind of operation" is an understatement that raises serious questions. What arrogance of power is it that resists "our preference," the preference of decent Americans? What are the limits of a usurpation of such power by the military and the C.I.A.?

Unless these questions are frankly answered, the nation's friends abroad and its youth at home will become increasingly cynical about all American claims and goals. It is the road to alienation and isolationism. This is a price this country cannot afford to pay.

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## The CIA and foreign aid

ANY country running a big-league foreign policy has "clean" and "dirty" activities overseas. The trick is to keep them separate so the second does not rub off on the first.

S: Dr. John A. Hannah, head of our foreign aid program, has officially disclosed that agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are posing as aid workers in Laos.

This regrettable practice started under President Kennedy in 1962 and continued under the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. Dr. Hannah would like to "get rid of this kind of operation," and Mr. Nixon would do well to free foreign aid from association with espionage and clandestine warfare.

Unlike professional CIA-baiters, we do not quarrel with the operation itself.

At great personal risk, CIA agents have been recruiting and training anti-communist guerrillas, observing enemy movements and acting as ground controllers for air strikes. Their activities are in response to North Vietnam's illegal invasion of neutral Laos and its threat to South Vietnam.

What we object to is the foreign-aid cover for the operation. The U.S. aid program and the Peace Corps are two to this country's most idealistic, unselfish efforts. The Communist bloc has long recognized them as such and has sought to discredit them. Now, by mixing aid with secret-agentry, we have foolishly given the Kremlin a stick to beat us with.

Do CIA agents really need a cover in Laos? In Vientiane every newsman, communist diplomat and barkeep seems to know what the CIA is up to. If the agency insists on a story, they could claim to be scientists studying the sex habits of elephants or the life style of opium smugglers.

This would be as believable as and less harmful than calling them rural development workers.